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Wed 22 Nov 2006

Olan vs. CA, 314 SCRA 273 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

Posted by Administrator under Remedial Law I
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Olan vs. CA (314 SCRA 273)

Andrei J. Zapanta

Facts: Petitioners Olan and Eballe were ordered by the court to vacate lots 3839 and 3842 of Brgy. Timugan, Los Baños, Laguna in ejectment case no. 979. Petitioners appealed the decision of the lower court to the Regional Trial Court where such decision was affirmed.

Private respondents filed a motion for the execution of judgement. The motion was granted by the court. Petitioners moved to quash on the ground that the lot being occupied by them was different from that being ordained in the dispositive portion of the lower court’s decision. Such motion was denied. Petitioners moved to reconsider, however, the said motion was again denied.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari and mandamus to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals to compel the court to admit evidence to support their contention that the lot they are possessing was not the lot described in the dispositive portion In the ejectment case 979 to the effect that it is a newly discovered evidence.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a court to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition. A writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Mandamus is applied employed to compel the performance of a ministerial function or duty when it is refused. It is not a discretionary duty. The petitioners should have filed instead a motion for new trial with the Regional Trial Court on the ground of newly discovered evidence in accordance with Rule 37 of the 1964 rules of court.

Petitioner failed to support their claim with affidavits to show compliance with the requisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for new trial.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Obra vs. CA, 317 SCRA 594 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

Posted by Administrator under Remedial Law I
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BENJAMIN D. OBRA and BRIG. GEN. TOMAS DUMPIT, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JAMES BRETT and JUNE PRILL BRETT, respondents.

[G.R. No. 120852. October 28, 1999]
SECOND DIVISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Andrei J. Zapanta

Facts: Petitioner Obra was the regional was the director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo Sciences in Baguio City. He received a letter from Jeanette Grybos in behalf of the Gillies heirs, complaining that Private Respondents had been conducting mining operations and activities in an area belonging to the Gillies family. The letter alleged that respondents were operating without the proper permit and further requested that such operations be stopped and that the equipment being used to carry out its operations be confiscated in favor of the Government. The same day, petitioner wrote a letter to Brig. General Dumpit, commander of the Regional Unified Command 1 (Co-petioner herein), requesting assistance to apprehend the truck being used by respondents. Accordingly, elements of the regional Unified Command , seized and impounded the said truck while entering the mining area. Private respondents filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages and applied for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court. The complaint allege that the seizure and impounding of the truck was illegal and in violation of their Constitutional right under article 32 of the 1973 Constitution for failing to determine the existence of probable cause to justify such acts. The court ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered petitioners to pay the amount of P100,000 as actual, compensatory, and exemplary damages. The court also issued a temporary restraining order directing the petitioners to desist and cease from preventing the truck from leaving the premises of the mine. Petitioners appealed the decision, however, it was denied. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the act of seizing and impounding of the truck valid and constitutional.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court. Petitioners invoke the PD 1281 which authorizes the Regional Director of the Bureau to “order the seizure and confiscation of tools being used in the commission of an offense”. Petitioners contend that that such provision is in accord with article 4 section 3 of the 1973 Constitution. However, the Supreme Court ruled that even if the there is a grant by law to non-judicial officers the power to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants, it does not exempt them from determining first if there is the existence of probable cause for the issuance thereof. The question to be answered here is whether there was an investigation concluded to justify the seizure and impounding of the truck, there was none.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cruz, 317 SCRA 761 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

Posted by Administrator under Remedial Law I
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NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. CAMILLE T. CRUZ and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 137136. November 3, 1999
FIRST DIVISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Andrei J. Zapanta

Facts:Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract of carriage committed when petitioner changed private respondent’s original itinerary. Private respondent claimed to have suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages because of the changes made

Petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging that the flight was cancelled due to maintenance problems and bad weather, and that the airline had done its best to re-book private respondent on the next available flights.

The trial proceeded until 1995 petitioner’s counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one Mario Garza, witness for petitioner, in New York. Private respondent filed her opposition and suggested written interrogatories instead. However, the trial court denied private respondent’s opposition, thus allowing the deposition to proceed. The oral deposition was taken in New York on July 24, 1995 or two days before the issuance of the trial court’s order allowing the deposition to proceed.

Private respondent questioned the conduct of the oral deposition as irregular and moved that the same be suppressed. It was alleged that such deposition was without the certification required by the officer taking the same that it is the true record of the testimony given by the deponent in violation of Rule 24, Section 20 of the Rules of Court. It was further alleged that the deposition was not securely sealed in an envelope and that the officer taking the deposition did not give any notice to the plaintiff of its filing.

These irregularities or defects were discovered by the plaintiff during the hearing on November 9, 1995 and plaintiff has acted with reasonable promptness after having ascertained the existence of the aforesaid irregularities and defects. However, private respondent’s motion was denied anew by the trial court.

Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court rendered a Decision granting the petition and set aside the rulings of the Regional Trial Court. It ordered to disallow the deposition and continue with the trial of the case without prejudice to petitioner’s right to cross examine defendant’s witness and to present rebuttal evidence.

Petitioner argues that the remedy of certiorari before respondent Court of Appeals was improper, as private respondent has every opportunity to question on appeal the trial court’s ruling admitting the deposition. Petitioner further asserts that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the oral deposition.

Issue: Whether or not the remedy of certiorari is proper.

Ruling: It was held that Petitioner’s arguments are untenable. It is proper for not allowing the deposition because the order did not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party. A writ of Certiorari is available only to review final judgment or decrees, and will be refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower tribunal. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

National Steel Corporation vs. RTC of Lanao del Norte, Br. 2, Iligan City, 304 SCRA 595 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

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National Steel Corporation, petitioner vs. The Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 2. Iligan City and E. Willkom Enterprises, Inc., respondents

G.R. No. 127004
Third Division
Purisima, J.: Ponente

Andrei J. Zapanta

FACTS: Petitioner-defendant Edward Wilkom Enterprises, Inc. (EWEI) together with one Ramiro Construction and respondents-petitioner National Steel Corporation (NSC) executed a contract whereby the former jointly undertook the contract for site development for the latter’s integrated iron and steel mills Complex to be established at Iligan City.

The services of Ramiro Construction was terminated and petitioner-defendant EWEI took over Ramiro’s Contractual Obligation. Due to this and to other causes deemed sufficient by EWEI, extensions of time for the termination of the project, initially agreed to be finished, were granted by NSC.

Plaintiff-defendant EWEI filed a case praying essentially for payments of the obligation plus interest from the time of delay; the price adjustment as PD 1594 and the exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees.

Defendant-petitioner NSC, then filed an answer with counterclaim to plaintiff’s complaints.

The court upon joint motion of both parties had issued an order dismissing the said complaint and counterclaim in view of the desire of both parties to implement Sec. 19 of the contract, providing for a resolution of any conflict by arbitration.

The parties then constituted an arbitration board. After series of hearings, Arbitrators rendered the decision. The RTC of Lanao affirmed and confirmed “In toto”, the judgement.

NSC filed a motion for reconsideration but the court dismissed said petition.

ISSUE: The pivot of inquiry here is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in not vacating the arbitrator’s award.

RULING: A stipulation to refer all future dispute to an arbitrator is valid. Congress enacted R.A. 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration Law, since there was a growing need for a law regulating arbitration in general. The parties in the present case, upon entering into a contract for Site Development, mutually agreed that any dispute arising from the said contract should be submitted for arbitration. It should be said that voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. As the petitioner availed of Rule 65, the court will not review the facts found nor even of law as interpreted or applied by the arbitrator unless the supposed errors of facts or of law are so patent and gross and prejudicial as to amount to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the arbitrators.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Mathay, Jr. vs. Felt Foods, Inc., 311 SCRA 658 (Roderick M. Villostas)

Posted by Administrator under Remedial Law I
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Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City, petitioner, vs. Felt Foods, Inc., respondent.

G.R. No. 137149 July 28,1999
Third Division
Justice Gonzaga-Reyes

Roderick M. Villostas

Facts: On May 14, 1997 petitioner issued a temporary business permit valid until December 31, 1997 in favor of the respondent to operate its business “Club Georgio” . Sometime in Novenber 1997 there were reports that the respondent violated the terms of the business permit. Thus, on Novenber 27, 1997 petitioner ordered the closure of the said establishment and ordered the City Legal Department to investigate the respondent’s reported violations of the terms of its business permit. Upon finding that there where violations of the terms of the business permit the petitioner cancelled the permit on December 15, 1997.

On December 31, 1997 respondent’s temporary business permit expired. On February 16, 1998 respondent filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to annul the petitioner’s closure order alleging that the said order was issued without due process. The petitioner on its motion to dismiss contends that the cause of action has been mooted by the expiration of the temporary business permit. However the regional trial Court as well as the Court of Appeals on appeal ruled in favor of the respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a case when it has rendered moot and academic by supervening event.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that courts of law will not assume jurisdiction over a case when it has been rendered moot and academic by supervening event. When the respondent’s business license expired on December 31, 1997 respondent ceased to have a legal right to do business which may be the proper subject of judicial relief and when the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on February 23, 1998 there was no more legal right in favor of the defendant to protect.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Mariscal vs. CA, 311 SCRA 51 (Roderick M. Villostas)

Posted by Administrator under Remedial Law I
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Rogelio Mariscal, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Bella C. Catalan, respondents.

G.R. No. 123926, July 22, 1999
Second Division
Justice Bellosillo

Roderick M. Villostas

Facts: Respondent Bella Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner Rogelio Mariscal before before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for the annulment of their marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been solemnized without a valid marriage license and for being bigamous. Two days later, Rogelio Mariscal filed his own complaint against Bella C. Catalan before the Regional Trial Court of Digos seeking likewise the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry her at gunpoint and that they had no valid license. Bella Catalan moved for the dismissal of the case filed by her husband invoking litis pendentia.

Issue: Whether or not the case filed by Rogelio Mariscal shopuld be dismissed due to litis pendentia

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Mariscal’s contention is no avail. In litis Pendentia what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. Because of the effort of the petitioner to resolved the case in a different venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue bessetting the two actions which is simply the nullification of a marriage contracted by the parties.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Magbanua vs. Villamar, 305 SCRA 132 (Roderick M. Villostas)

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Ludivina Marisga-Magbanua. Complainant, vs. Emilio T. Villamar V, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, respondent.

A.M. No. P-99-1297, march 25, 1999
Second Division
Justice Mendoza

Roderick M. Villostas

Facts: The case is a complaint filed by Ludivina Marisga-Magbanua against respondent Sheriff Emilio T. Villamar V of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro for dereliction of duty in connection with the execution of the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. R-838. After the decision had become final and executory, the RTC on October 24, 1996 issued a writ of execution. However, on January 14, 1997, complainant moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and order of demolition, alleging that the same was necessary in view of the sheriff’s report showing that there was failure in implementing the writ of execution and also because she was in dire need of the property. The RTC granted the motion and issued a alias writ of execution and a writ of demolition.

However the sheriff failed to enforce the execution therefore the complainant prayed in her complaint the a proper administrative case be filed against the respondent sheriff. The sheriff contends in his comment that there was a need for a relocation survey before he can enforce the said decision and that the said property is not wholly owned by the complainant.

Issue: Whether or not the sheriff is guilty of dereliction of duty.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that execution is the fruit and the end suit and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. It, therefore, behooves sheriffs to be zealous in the performance of their duties, unless restrained by a court order to the contrary, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not duly delayed.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Madrigal vs. CA, 319 SCRA 331 (Roderick M. Villostas)

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Spouses Mariano Madrigal and Julieta Madrigal, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, The Honorable Presiding Judge, Br. 139, RTC, City of Makati & Spouses Joseph and Josefina Aquino, repondent.

G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999
Third Division
Justice Purisima

Roderick M. Villostas

Facts: The case is a petition for Review on Certiorari, under rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul the trial court’s Order of Default.

The private respondent brought a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against the petitioner. The summons were duly served with intercity but not with Mariano.

Issue: Whether or not the impossibility of personal service justifying the availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the impossibility of personal services justifying the availment of substitute service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal services failed. – This Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why effort exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service of Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service connot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Maceda, Jr. vs. DBP, 313 SCRA 233 (Luzviminda C. Villanueva)

Posted by Administrator under Remedial Law I
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BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, JR. and TERESITA MACEDA-DOCENA, petitioners Vs DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

CASE NUMBER: GR NO. 135128
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
DIVISION: THIRD DIVISION

Luzviminda C. Villanueva

FACTS: The case commenced on October 15, 1984 with the filing by MACEDA of a Complaint for Specific Performance with DAMAGES against the Development Bank of the Philippines and Oscar Devera, one of its managers.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they were the owners of the Old Gran Hotel in Tacloban City, that pursuant to their plan to build a new Gran Hotel, they applied for an Eleven Million Peso (Php 11,000,000) loan with the DBP.

The petitioners complained of irregularities in their transactions with the bank. They alleged that private respondents’ ACTS prevented them from completing the new Gran Hotel and from realizing profits there from.

Petitioners thus prayed that:

1.    Private respondents be ordered to release the balance of their approved loan.
2.    That the interests and other charges imposed on the loan be nullified
3.    That DBP be made to pay them unrealized earnings and/or loss of income and damages.

The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners. Furthermore the trial court granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the petitioners.

DBP appealed the Decision to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of respondent Bank, the CA concluded that there existed no sufficient ground or compelling reason to allow the execution of the judgment pending appeal.

ISSUE: The issue is whether or not the CA erred when it reversed the trial court’s ruling granting execution of the latter’s decision pending appeal. More simply stated, are there good reasons to justify execution of the trial court judgment pending appeal?

RULING: The Court ruled that good reasons were not sufficiently established to justify the execution of judgment pending appeal.

The execution of judgment pending appeal is governed by Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The rule provided that “Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reason to be stated in a special orders after due hearing.”

The Court further ruled that there are three requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal:

a.    There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party.
b.    There must be a good reason for execution pending appeal and
c.    The good reason must be stated in a special order

The good reason invoked by the trial court was the urgency resulting from almost 20 years of delay and the yearly increase in costs that made the completion of the hotel construction more difficult. The court was not convinced.

The Court stressed that an execution pending appeal is an extra ordinary remedy being more of the exception rather than the rule. It is allowed only upon showing of “good reason” by the movant. In the present case, the court finds no justification, hence the petition is DENIED.

Wed 22 Nov 2006

Lima vs. Transway Sales Corporation, 317 SCRA 208 (Luzviminda C. Villanueva)

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JOHNNY K. LIMA and WILLIAM LIMA, petitioners Vs TRANSWAY SALES CORPORATION and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

CASE NUMBER: GR NO. 106770
PONENTE: PURISIMA, J.
DIVISION: THIRD DIVISION

Luzviminda C. Villanueva

FACTS: At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules Of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

On Oct 19, 1981 Johnny Lima brought a complaint against Transway Sales Corp. and Jose U. Yao for delivery of Personal Property with Damages and prayers for the issuance of writ of replevin. Sometime before July 1981, Plaintiff contracted the defendant to install an air-conditioning unit in plaintiff’s Volkswagen car. The defendant installed the air-conditioning unit. Sometime in the month of July 1981, the defendant who have executed work on the vehicle by installing thereon air-conditioning unit retained said vehicle by way of pledge until they shall have been paid by the plaintiff the value of the air conditioning unit.

In an Order dated November 15, 1981, Judge Francisco Consolacion of the lower court of origin found the existence of a mechanic’s lien in favor of defendant and denied the application for seizure sought for by plaintiffs.

The defendant filed a counter claim for damages.

The lower court dismissed petitioners’ complaint and rendered judgment on defendant’s counter claim, ordering plaintiff to pay defendants damages.

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all aspects. Hence this petition for review on Certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not a mechanic’s lien exist for works done upon a motor vehicle which was released to the owners to be paid on credit or whether or not a mechanic’s lien may be reinstated automatically on the subject property after it was released to their owners but subsequently returned to the mechanic for further repairs.

Second issue is whether or not petitioner-appellants should be held liable for damages.

RULING: The Court ruled that on the matter of existence of mechanic’s lien in favor of the defendant, Article 1731 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides that the latter can legally retain by way of pledge, the movable upon which it executed its work.

The Court further ruled that the award for damages prayed for in the counter claim embodied in the Answer of the respondent corporation is SUSTAINABLE. Under Section 6, Rule 6, of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a COUNTER CLAIM, is any claim, which a defending party may have against an opposing party. According to the Court, a counterclaim partakes of the nature of a COMPLAINT OR CAUSE OF ACTION against the plaintiff. It is an independent action, separate and distinct from the original complaint.

The Court denied the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRMED the CA Decision

NotesBank Blog

Olan vs. CA, 314 SCRA 273 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

Obra vs. CA, 317 SCRA 594 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cruz, 317 SCRA 761 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

National Steel Corporation vs. RTC of Lanao del Norte, Br. 2, Iligan City, 304 SCRA 595 (Andrei J. Zapanta)

Mathay, Jr. vs. Felt Foods, Inc., 311 SCRA 658 (Roderick M. Villostas)

Mariscal vs. CA, 311 SCRA 51 (Roderick M. Villostas)

Magbanua vs. Villamar, 305 SCRA 132 (Roderick M. Villostas)

Madrigal vs. CA, 319 SCRA 331 (Roderick M. Villostas)

Maceda, Jr. vs. DBP, 313 SCRA 233 (Luzviminda C. Villanueva)

Lima vs. Transway Sales Corporation, 317 SCRA 208 (Luzviminda C. Villanueva)

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